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Abstract
This brief paper highlights some of the issues that
have arisen in a research that emerging from the
experience of attempting to extend design analysis
and criticism into those student projects which
engaged with ‘incorporated technologies’ such as
nanotechnology, virtual and augmented reality, DNA
computing or implant augmentation. The research
itself will take the form of a number of narratives
intended to explore and invite discussion of ideas
drawn from philosophy and science, posited as a
means to initiate discussion among designers. This
paper particularly explores how this process of
dialogue arose from the discussion of complex and
‘uncertain’ ideas with student designers and
emerged from the experience of developing
curricula for the undergraduate ‘design futures’
course at the University of Wales. It is suggested
that issues emerging from this research may have
some impact upon the design of future pedagogies
for design education and upon the future of
industrial design conceptualisation. Questions are
raised of the methodology of those designers who
claim to model users experiences through
metaphoric or comparative allusion to antique
models of mechanical processes or through social
interactions conceived to bear comparison with
established human rituals. The paper describes how
a speculative method of dialogue is being designed
in order to explore the potential of an extensionist
philosophical model. The dialogic method, whilst still
in the process of construction, is centred upon a
process of ‘story-telling’. It is anticipated that these
stories will go some way towards the embodied,
inclusion of emerging uncertain and unorthodox
ideas of ‘extension’ in philosophy, biology, ecology,
psychology and neuroscientific into the schema of
industrial design conceptualisation.
Key words: Industrial Design, emerging technology,
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Between 1997 and 2003 Design Futures was an
industrial design undergraduate course at University
of Wales Newport. Prioritising ideas and critical
analysis above all the course was intent upon
exploring the future of design as a cultural activity.
Students were encouraged to engage with the
design implications of ‘future’ technologies.
Incorporated technologies such as nanotechnology,
virtual and augmented reality, DNA computing or
implant augmentation presented particular problems
for the course team. For whilst such technologies -
of such intangibility that their presentation denied
‘objective’ realisation - invited design consideration it
was particularly problematic to extend design
analysis and criticism when the design consequence
could not be easily modelled. The initial inclination
was to banish such projects from the curriculum and
to focus upon more orthodox inclinations of
interaction design or eco-design and the course
successfully developed a specialism in these fields. 
The research, to which this paper can only allude
briefly, is concerned to enquire of the boundaries of
design conceptualisation. To date the research has
surveyed a range of methodologies accounting for
the phenomenological experience some forms of
emerging technologies are anticipated to create. The
research enquires whether such technologies can
really be beyond the scope of design and has
thrown up questions of the methodology of
designers who seek to humanise technology and
explores whether a means can be found - through
story-telling - of opening a broader ontological
debate among the industrial design community. If
the methodology proves successful, a contribution
might then be made towards the establishment of an
engagement with emerging forms of technology,
which are understood to deny orthodox taxonomy.
At the heart of this research lies a concern to
investigate the International Council of Societies of
Industrial Design, definition of industrial design:
a creative activity…  the central factor of innovative
humanisation of technologies... (ICSIC 20041) 
in light of Mitchell’s nascent concept of the illusory
product (Mitchell 1988) and the emergence of a
post-mechanistic science. The claim of the research
described here, that recent direction of focusing
upon the user may be interpreted as a deterministic
constraint upon human creativity, is tested, in part as
an intellectual consequence of the pedagogic
requirement placed upon students to create short
films. The intention of these films was to enable
insight into the experience of proposed design
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solutions. Although we make no particular claim to
the invention this pedagogic approach, Design
Futures was rather unique in the experimental
approach it took to this process. Over time, these
films evolved from the rather simplistic infomercials
into artworks in themselves, bearing comparison to
experimental film or video art. These films became
not so much ‘explanations’ of design experiences,
but forms of ontological insight into experiences of
being, enabled or enhanced by incorporated
technological systems. Questions were invited;
whether the orchestration of being might be thought
a legitimate design process of humanisation? Does
this not extend the role of industrial design in
processes of enabling ‘poetic’ experiences of being
in the mechanical or industrial condition into a new
territory? As the investigation of the ontological
gained fluency, it seemed as if the recent inclination
by industrial design to focus upon attempts to fit
such experiences into an existing pattern of living
might bear some comparison with late nineteenth
century attempts to deny industrialisation. (Dunne
1999) Just as industrial design emerged as a
formation of being in the industrial condition then
might not another form of design emerge in the
twenty first century? A posthuman, transhuman,
transsexual Joe or Josephine maybe? (Dreyfuss,
1955) Such a form of design will surely go beyond
methodology of establishing criteria for the ‘usability’
or ‘user friendliness’ of technologies by modelling
‘users’ experiences through metaphoric or
comparative allusion to antique models of
mechanical processes or human rituals from another
era? Design philosophies focusing upon artifice,
simulacra and the virtual have struggled to find
rationality in taxonomies of the ‘experience’ of
technological artifice and to include its ‘deception’
into post-modern philosophical ‘grounding’ of being.
As new technologies emerge formed of flesh and
enacted by the quanta, so they can be interpreted to
bring with them new riddles for those who seek
‘metaphorical’ taxonomy. 
In another age Kapp wrote of the ‘intrinsic
relationship that arises between tools and organs’
(Kapp 1877: 23)  although such ideas were posited
in a mechanical construct. ‘Since the organ whose
utility and power is to be increased is the controlling
factor, the appropriate form of a tool can be derived
only from that organ.’ When Kapp suggests that ‘in
the tool the human continually produces itself’ (Kapp
1877: 23) he opens an intriguing new theoretical
territory of the extended body. In more recent
psychotechnological thought, (McLuhan 1997,
Mazlish 1993 , DeKerchhove 1997 and Levy 1997
for example) extension appears not as a limited
metaphor, but more directly as an integrative
approach to the formation of technological species. If
industrial design is interpreted to have taken the idea
of technology as extension into its conceptualisation
at all, it has chosen to draw attention to the visible,
cultural ‘body’ and to extend this outward. If industrial
design interprets the body to both be something of
the imagination and to act directly in the world in
intimate relation to the mind, then it becomes
possible to interpret theoretical focus upon the
‘erotic’ potential of technology as an ‘imaginary
body’. By including psychoanalysis and ideas of
identity formation into theorisations of desire,
industrial design conceptualisation can be shown to
associate technology as a form of ‘beautiful’ body,
forming an extension of the identity of the self – as
body – as fixation – in a form of technonarcissism.
Cyborg (mankind in the image of machine) or
Android (machine in the image of mankind) can be
interpreted to appear in industrial design conception
as bodies of complex analysis with ideas of power
and gender and desire and almost any other
particular, local, cultural phenomena one may care to
include. If the inhuman Lyotard (Lyotard 1991)
argument is founded upon the certainty of technology
as something other than human, then its rhetoric can
be accused of overly accounting for imagining ‘sexy’
dynamic recent technologies at the expense of what
is known of human anthropology. We might enquire
when ‘we’ if ever, were not a species, formed in a
condition of technology? 
If emerging technologies are in phylum at once
biological and synthetic, material and immaterial,
organic and inorganic then critical interpretations of
theories of the inhuman relying upon biological
distinction are thrown into question.  (See particularly
Deleuze and Guattari 1988) If no humanity can be
found ‘without’ technology, then is technology better
conceptualised as an extension of humanity itself? If
technology can be considered human then what of
Lyotard’s fears? Do we ‘feel’ less human when
technology is included into our phylum? If such a
consideration is made then what can industrial
design mean when it seeks to ‘humanise’
technology? Should we leave the challenge of
unravelling such complexity to philosophers alone?
Or is it possible to find in its experience of bringing
together, science and philosophy into intimate and
imaginative space in the conception of what it is to
be a person, how industrial design might contribute
to this kind of debate? 
Much recent science and philosophy, in endeavouring
to investigate the phenomena of consciousness,
throws doubt upon humanistic schema:
There are strong indications that among the loose
federation of sciences dealing with knowledge, and
cognition - the cognitive sciences - there is a slowly
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growing conviction that [the Cartesian picture of
formal, logical, well defined units of knowledge] is
upside down, that a radical paradigmatic or
epistemological shift is rapidly developing. At the
very center of this emerging view is the belief that
the proper units of knowledge are primary concrete,
embodied, incorporated, lived. (Varela 1992: 320)
In theorisations of deep ecologies which include
chaos mathematics, Cartesian schema is similarly
challenged in that it is identified as an inhibition to
the development of a sustainable ecological
apprehension of interconnectivity:
My thesis has been that a theory of living systems
consistent with the philosophical framework of deep
ecology, including an appropriate mathematical
language, and implying a non-mechanistic, post
Cartesian understanding of life, is now emerging.
(Capra 1997: 153)
Similarity with Capra can be claimed in Idhe’s (Idhe
2002) analysis of technology as the media of reality
or with Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s (Verla et al
1993) rather more problematic interpretations of the
role of the corporeality of experience or Mazlish’s
(Mazlish 1993) claims for a future synthesis of
technology and humanity. Even the ‘situated actions’
of Suchman (Suchman 1987) can reasonably be
interpreted to place experience in an embodied
context. In any case these challenges to the
ideology of technology as an extrinsic object of the
world seeking resolution might reasonably be
regarded as a challenge to the hegemony of
industrial design conceptualisation. Pepperell
(Pepperell 2003 and Pepperell and Punt 2000) has
sought to develop an extensionist mode of creative
philosophy, finding no distinction in objects or
between the mind, body and world. Pepperell
defines extensionism thus: 
…rather than regarding identifiable objects of the
world as coherent and discrete, Extensionism holds
that all objects and events extend indefinitely
through time and space. However, we normally
acknowledge only a fractional part of the real extent
of any object because of constraints inherent in our
perceptual apparatus…’ (Pepperell 2003:188)
An extensionist schema holds that no useful border
can be found in objects or phenomena in so much as
all ‘objects’ and ‘properties’ are considered formed as
universal states of energy, evident as excitation or
density. Any claimed distinction is relative to human
perspective as it appears to human conception. Such
a philosophical view is supported by emerging physics
in which space and time are interpreted as human
conceptions without universal foundation. An
extensionist philosophy suggests that such knowledge
accepted as a facet of physics should be applied to
the philosophical interpretation of being. The upshot of
such a schema is that phenomena which can appear
in cognition as beyond rational reduction or as
fractures of states of reality only do so in so much as
limited human conception is unable to accommodate
their appearance in existing taxonomies. Emerging
technologies utilising energy exchange at a sub-
atomic level are bound to resist limiting human
taxonomy founded in the human schema.
Deleule has pursued the ‘indelible mark left upon the
modern era’ (Deleule 1992:203). by the Cartesian
separation of mind from the body. Deleule cites
Merleau-Ponty, (Merleau-Ponty 2003), among others
finding the separation of the objective and subjective
knowledge of the world to be similarly problematic in
consideration of the experience of perception
through the body, itself being of the world:
We live in an age of telepresence and virtual reality.
The sciences of the mind are finally paying heed to
the centrality of the body and world. Everything
around us drives home the intimacy of perception,
action and thought? (Clarke, 2003:1)
Whilst remaining something of a mystery to science,
for many of those engaged in consciousness
research question the established idea of an outside
world brought to the mind through the senses,
challenging the everyday sense of a world is outside
the body and conceptions of images formed
somehow independently of substance. Advanced
neuroscience and neurophysics (see particularly
Hameroff 1999), in developments in
psychopharmacology - particularly in relation to
research in the field of entheogens2 - and in the
emerging ‘scientific’ fields of quantum
consciousness, researchers have found it useful to
include artists, designers and theologians into their
enquiries. (See particularly CAIIA3 and Fagg 1999)
Similar issues can be found in advanced research in
developing biomolecular computation (Sometimes
referred to as DNA computing) (Calude and Päun
2002), and quantum transistorisation4. (Shapiro et al
2002) Research with the direct connection of
biological material has similarly moved from fiction
2 Entheogens. Psychoactive chemicals associated with Shamanic or religious uses.
3 Centre for the Advanced Enquiry Into Interactive Arts: www.caiia-star.net
4 Emerging technologies which utilise the complimentarity of DNA - its double-strandedness - and its molecular scale make it
both an exceptional structure for computation and create the potential for massively arrayed biological computing technologies
and data storage. In such computers, all possible answers are computed simultaneously with very low error rates.
DATA International Research Conference 2004 
Creativity and Innovation
into reality with the fusing of the neuron to silicon
array. (Straub, Meyer and Fromherz 2001) Such
computers which until recently utilised farmed and
‘extracted’ bacterial DNA have recently taken a
divergent turn with developments demonstrating
incorporation, directly intervening into the higher
functionality of the body. Whilst it may seem
somewhat premature to claim such technologies as
likely to appear in everyday life in the near term,
their emergence can be understood to invite
questions of the likely emergence of  precognitive
activity of the body as a experiential concern:
Computers will continue to miniaturise themselves,
though, eventually disappearing into a microverse
where their ever-vaster calculations and
mathematical models will become one with the
quarks and the charms. (Ballard 1992: 273)
Norretranders (Norretranders 1998) and Wegner
(Wegner 2002) particularly point to the extent of the
processing of the body which remains outside of
consciousness, drawing attention to the manner in
which hitherto ‘paranormal’ phenomena might be
explained in terms of such nonconscious or
preconscious processing (Baars 1994). Wegner
describes experiments with the planchette,
automatic writing, pendulum and divining rods and
draws upon phenomena such as blind-sight and
phantom limbs in order to demonstrate
nonconscious processes interpreted to give rise to
consciousness. Prescience’ is employed as a
terminology, ring-fencing certain ‘functionalistic’,
processes of the body giving rise to later cognitive
interpretation. Care is taken to recognise the blurred
borders of the non-conscious and the unconscious,
automatic or ‘tacit’ (Polyani 1966) in the integrative
processes of ‘knowledge’ in non-conscious actions
of the body and appearing as reflex actions of the
body. Such a term can then usefully include
phenomena such as automatism, unattended
processing, subliminal processing, implicit
processing and pre-perceptual processing (Baars
1994) or proprioceptive (Sherrington 1906) activity.
As Ascott has stated, ‘if the interaction is not evident
to us we are no more users [of technology] than we
are the “users of our eyes, ears, nerves and
hormones.’ (Ascott 1995: 22-24)
If a form of extensionism is found to be effective as
a means to ‘re-find coexistence’ in virtuality and
reality, humanity and technology in the body as
location, then it makes it possible to reject Lyotard,
the Cyborg and the Android conception from
industrial design. By placing attention upon the
phenomena of being in an extended world –
accepting phenomena as they arrive in
consciousness not as acts of deception but as
extensions of the creative potential of human
memory and imagination, industrial design
conceptualisation may be able to go far beyond
ideas of future iterations of technological application
such as that envisioned by corporate capitalism:
Long term, the PC and workstation will wither because
computing access will be everywhere in the walls, on
wrists, and in scrap computers (like scrap paper) lying
about to be grabbed as needed. (Weiser 1998: 23)
This research is concerned to explore the effect of
such a dynamic shift in thinking upon industrial
design. Focusing upon the extended ‘body’ as the
intimate place in which ‘consciousness’ is made
‘person’ and by drawing upon scientific and
philosophical ideas as they challenge the
hegemonic schema, the research enquires whether
ideas of ‘humanisation’ and ‘interaction’ can continue
to have meaning. If no useful distinction is drawn
between the human and technology, and the
manner in which we identify them is posited as
limiting taxonomy. (Wittgenstein 1958) then, can
industrial design really focus upon the activities
technologies afford (Norman 1990, 1993 and also
Biocca 1997) without being at risk of damaging a
poetry of being.
Given how likely the advanced scientific knowledge
implied by many of the technologies cited in the
research is to be beyond the scope of the research,
care must be taken to engage with ideas at an
‘operative’ level for industrial design
conceptualisation. That is at a level that has
meaning and ‘validity’ in everyday life,
commensurate with the ‘everydayness of encounters
with industrial design. The intention of this research
is not to add fuel to the philosophical fields it
encounters nor to add anything significant to
scientific knowledge, except in so much as an
exploration of the validity of these ideas in a
discussion of industrial design conceptualisation.
The aim of the research is to enquire how these
ideas can be explored in such a manner as to have
resonance in the industrial design community.
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